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CASENOTE
WHEN DOES UNETHICAL BECOME CRIMINAL? INTERPRETING THE GRATUITY PROVISION OF
18 U.S.C. § 201
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California'
1. INTRODUCTION
As another season of political campaigning begins, so does renewed public discussion of campaign reform and
political honesty. This Supreme Court decision provides considerable guidance for the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(1)(A), a criminal statute concerning gift giving to public officials.
The importance of the gratuity statute cannot be underestimated because "political corruption investigations that
initially appear to involve bribery often conclude with gratuities convictions, if they are prosecuted at all.2 The gratuity
statute is an important tool to combat political corruption and in US. v. Sun-Diamond, the Supreme Court took an
important step in clarifying the requirements necessary for a conviction.
11. FACTS AND HOLDING
On September 9, 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit appointed Donald
C. Smaltz to the position of Independent Counsel.3 His job was to investigate whether Secretary of Agriculture Alphonse
Michael Espy violated federal law by acceptin improper gifts from organizations or individuals with business matters
pending before the Department of Agriculture. In December 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit convened a grand jury.5 The grand jury returned an indictment against Sun-Diamond Growers of
California, an agricultural cooperative, alleging that the defendant had unlawfully provided $9,000 worth of gifts directly
or indirectly, to Secretary Espy, in violation of the federal gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)7 The indictment
further alleged that Sun-Diamond devised and executed a scheme to make an unlawful corporate contribution, in the name
of another, in the amount of $4,000 to a federal candidate for office, in violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(a) and 441(f).
These indictments both alleged that there were two matters of significant economic interest to Sun-Diamond
pending before the Department of Agriculture and Secretary Espy.9 In 1992, the EPA announced plans to promulgate a
rule that would phase out and ultimately ban the use of methyl bromide 0 Methyl bromide was a pesticide used by certain
Sun-Diamond cooperative members. Because they lacked a viable alternative, these members were concerned about the
' 526 U.S. 398 (1999).2 George D. Brown, The Gratuities Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEORGETOWN L.J. 2045, 2049
(1998).
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 941 F. Supp. 1262 (D.D.C. 1996).
4 Id.
s Id.
6 Id. Count I alleged that Sun-Diamond expended, over a fourteen-month period. $2.295 for tickets to the 1993 U.S. Open Tennis Tournament,
approximately $2,427 for luggage, approximately $665 for meals, and approximately $524 for a framed print, packing for the print, and a crystal
bowl. Count II alleged that Sun-Diamond also expended $3,100 to Secretary Espy's girlfriend. Patricia Dempsey. to pay for the cost of an airplane
ticket that enabled her to accompany him to a trade association conference in Greece.
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (1994) provides:
Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly gives, offers, or
promises anything of value to any public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because
of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public
official . . . shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
8 Sun-Diamond Growers, 941 F. Supp. at 1265. This charge was contained in Counts Ill through IX and the alleged beneficiary of this
unlawful scheme was Henry Espy, Secretary Espy's brother, during his unsuccessful campaign for the congressional seat Secretary Espy vacated
when he became Secretary of Agriculture.
9 Id. at 1265.
'0 Id. at 1266.
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economic impact of this ruling." As a result, Sun-Diamond actively lobbied the Department of Agriculture to persuade
the EPA to delay promulgating the rule.12 They also sought to have the Department of Agriculture increase its funding for
research investigating alternatives to methyl bromide.13 The second matter of great interest to Sun-Diamond that was
pending before Secretary of Agriculture Espy was the administration of the market promotion program ("MPP") grant
fund.14 When Congress enacted budget legislation that potentially limited, even eliminated, the MMP grants Sun-
Diamond could receive, Sun-Diamond lobbied Secretary Espy to adopt regulatory definitions that would allow them to
continue receiving the MMP grants.
Sun-Diamond moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the charge which alleged a violation of the gratuity
statute failed to allege that 1) Sun-Diamond provided "things of value" to Secretary Espy; and 2) Sun-Diamond rewarded
Secretary Espy for an act he had already performed or had committed himself to perform. They also contended that the
allegations set forth did not distinguish between innocent gift giving and illegal gratuities.'6 The United States District
Court for the District of Columbia denied the motion and held that the gratuity statute did not require an indictment to
allege a nexus between provision of things of value and a specific official act performed or committed to be performed by
the official. Rather, the statute only required that the provider of the gratuity have matters pending within purview of the
official receiving gratuity." The court also held that the companionship of Espy's girlfriend provided by Sun-Diamond's
gift of an airplane ticket, constituted a "thing of value." 8 Subsequently, the court convicted Sun-Diamond of violating the
gratuity statute, committing wire fraud, and making illegal campaign contributions19
Sun-Diamond filed a post-verdict motion for acquittal and alleged that there was insufficient evidence to support
the wire fraud convictions and that the corporate officer acted to further corporate interests when he made illegal
campaign contributions. 20 The district court held that the evidence was sufficient and the motion for judgment of acquittal
was denied.
Sun-Diamond appealed their conviction arguing, among other things, that the gratuity statute required the
government prove a nexus between each unauthorized gift and some specifically identified official act, performed or
hoped to be performed, for which the gift was given.22 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed and,
while it affirmed much of the trial court's decision, it reversed and remanded Count I-the violation of the gratuity
statute-for a new trial. The court held that the Government failed to prove this nexus in the indictment and that the
trial court's charge allowed the jury to convict on a theory precluded by the statute2 Specifically, the court rejected the
Government's interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), which stated that "gifts motivated solely by the recipient's
official position may be illegal gratuities."2 5 The court held that case precedent and most importantly, the language of the
statute required a link between the unauthorized gift and a specific, concrete official act. Because the Government did
not prove either that a link existed or that there was requisite intent, the trial court interpreted the statute too broadly and
the jury instructions and the conviction were fatally flawed27 The court also disagreed with Sun-Diamond's conclusion
that this error was sufficient for an acquittal, but the court agreed that the jury charge on the gratuity counts was in error
and required a remand for a new trial.2
Id. at 1265-66.
12 Id. at 1266.
" Id. at 1266.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California. 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
'5 Id. at 964.
6 United States v Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 941 F.Supp. 1262 (D.D.C. 1996).
17 Id.
18 Id.
'9 U.S. v Sun-Diamond Growers of California. 941 F.Supp. 1262 (D.D.C. 1996).
20 U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 964 F.Supp. 486 (D.D.C. 1997).
21 id.
22 U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California. 138 F.3d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
2' Id. at 977.
24 Id.
21 Id. at 968.
26 Id. Specifically the --for or because of any official act" clause.
27 Id. at 965.
28 Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the issues arising under 18 U.S.C. § 201, specifically: how to
distinguish between the bribery and gratuity provisions; that the "link requirement" should be affirmed; and that jury
instructions which did not require the link were in error should be affirmed29 First, the Supreme Court affirmed case
precedent which distinguished a violation of the gratuity provision from that of bribery by the variation in requisite
intent-namely, that bribery requires a quid pro quo, while an illegal gratuity may merely constitute a reward for some
past or future official act.30 Secondly, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that a violation of the
gratuity provision, § 201(c)(1)(A), required that the Government prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a
federal official and a specific "official act" for or because of which it was given.3' The court rejected the Government's
interpretation of the gratuity provision that stated a conviction was sufficient if it alleged that the defendant provided
things of value to the public official merely because of his position. 32 Finally, the Court rejected the Government's
argument that the jury instructions, which followed the Government's flawed interpretation of the statute, were harmless
error.33
Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that when attempting to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the
Government must prove a link between the unlawful gratuity and a specific official act to sustain a conviction.34
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Legal Origins of the Gratuity Provision Embodied in 18 US.C. § 201
After a "handful of well-publicized instances of questionable conduct or demonstrated misconduct of high
officials in two administrations" that resulted in "obtrusive" Congressional investigations, conflicts of interest and
political corruption became a topic of great political and public concern in the early 1960s Following up on a campaign
promise, President John F. Kennedy appointed a three-person Advisory Panel to study conflict-of-interest reform and to
recommend a legislative course of action. 6 On October 23, 1962, he signed into law the bill that encompassed those
recommendations.37
The Act was an important step in improving a body of law that had been criticized as being disorganized,
ambiguous, and inadequate. The Act consolidated "scattered and uncoordinated statutes" into a united act, lauded for its
clarity and consistency.39 In adding the new § 201 to Title 18 of the United States Code, the act consolidated a "plethora
of piecemeal bribery statutes."40 However, while it clarified many conflict of interest provisions, it failed to adequately
delineate the differences in the bribery and gratuity proscriptions of 18 U.S.C. § 201.41 In fact, it is possible to interpret
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) as merely being a "form of second-degree bribery" instead of an independent and distinct
gratuity offense.42 Nevertheless, while a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(1)(A) has been treated as a lesser included
offense of bribery,4 courts have consistently treated § 201 as creating two separate offenses: bribery and illegal gratuity.44
29 U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 119 S. Ct. 1402
30 Id. at 1406.
" Id. at 1402.
32 Id. at 1403.
3 Id. at 1404.
34 See generally U.S. v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 119 S. Ct. 1402.
3 Roswell B. Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARVARD L. REv. 1113-15 (1963).
36 Id. at 1117.
n Id. This legislation, H.R. 8140, went into effect January 21. 1963 (90 days later). Pub. L. 87-849, 76 Stat. 1119 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. including §§ 201-09, 18) [herinafter The Act].
38 Perkins, supra note 33, at 1113, 1117.
3 Perkins, supra note 33, at 163.
40 Perkins, supra note 33, at 1119.
4' George D. Brown, The Gratuities Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEORGETOwN L.J. 2045. 2060-01
(1998).
42 Id. at 2061. It is important to note that when the Act was initially passed the gratuity provision was originally embodied in § 201(g).
43 United States v. Crutchfield, 547 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1977). However, illegal gratuity need not always be a lesser included offense of
bribery. See United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
4 Brown, supra note 40, at 2061-62.
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B. 18 US.C. § 201: Drawing the Line Between Gratuity and Bribery
While the courts have clearly established that bribery and gratuity are two separate offenses, they have struggled
to clearly delineate the difference between the two. Because both offenses share much of the same analytical framework,
it is nearly impossible to define what a violation of the gratuity provision entails without comparing it to the bribery
offense. Frequently, the elements of the gratuity offense have been defined in the negative-what is not required, in
contrast to the bribery proscription.
One difference between the bribery and gratuity provisions is the requisite intent. To sustain a bribery conviction,
the prosecution must establish that the bribe was given or received "corruptly.'45 The intent required to sustain a gratuity
conviction has been considerably more nebulous46 United States v. Campbell held that the prosecution must prove that
"the alleged gratuities be given and received 'knowingly and willingly,' and 'for or because of an official act."4  In
United States v. Standefer, the court held that the gratuity provision did not obligate the Government to prove a specific
48intent .
Explaining that "the giving of a gratuity is an offense much different than bribery," United States v. Secord held
that one key distinction is that the gratuity provision does not require proof of a "quid pro quo," while the bribery charge
clearly does.49 Knowing what has not been required for a violation of the gratuity offense is helpful but it doesn't address
what all is required. A survey of case law has shown that there has been little consistency on this point.
C. Interpreting the Gratuity Provision
Conceptually, it is helpful to view the differing case law approaches as different points along a spectrumfo On
one side of the spectrum are strict requirements akin to those necessary for a bribery offense, such as requiring a direct
relationship between the "gift" and the "official act." On the other end of the spectrum are cases which have characterized
gratuity offenses as "status offenses," that a gift given to an "official" who is in a position to potentially benefit the giver
was sufficient enough grounds for a violation of the gratuity offense.
1. The Gratuity Provision as a Status Offense
The United States District Court in the District of Columbia, the trial court that eventually was the first to hear
Sun-Diamond," articulated the gratuity proscription as a status offense in United States v. Richard Secord . Richard
Secord, of Iran-Contra fame, was charged with, among other things, giving an illegal gratuity to a government official,
Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North "for or because of any official act performed or to be performed.'4 The court, in
distinguishing the gratuity offense from bribery, held that the Government need not prove that the "gratuity was given in
exchange for any specific official act," rather "that the defendant acted simply because of North's official position, in
appreciation for their relationship, or in anticipation of its continuation."55
This court was not alone when it held that giving a gift solely in recognition of an official's "status," without any
link to a specific "official act," was sufficient to uphold a § 201 gratuity conviction. In United States v. Standefer6 the
defendant, a Gulf Oil vice president, was convicted of providing illegal gratuities to Cyril J. Niederberger, an Internal
4 United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141. 149 (D.C.Cir. 1982).
46 Id.
4 id.
4 United States v. F.W. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1080 (3d Cir. 1979).
4 United States v. Richard Secord, 726 F. Supp. 845, 847 (D.D.C. 1989).
50 Brown. supra note 40, at 2062.
51 Brown' supra note 40, at 2062.
5 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California. 941 F.Supp. 1262 (D.D.C. 1996).
53 Secord, 726 F. Supp. at 847.
54 Id. at 846. citing language from 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (Supp. 1989).
" Secord. 726 F.Supp. at 847 (citing United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455. 479 (5th Cir. 1978) and United States v. Crutchfield, 547 F.2d 496(9th Cir. 1977)).
56 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979).
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Revenue Service agent in charge of auditing Gulf Oil's federal income tax returns.5 The Third Circuit denied any
requirement of specific intent, did not consider or mention a link requirement, and held that "all that was required in order
to convict Standefer was that the jury conclude that the gifts were given by him for or because of Niederberger's official
position, and not solely for reasons of friendship or social purpose."58
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Evans,59 also supported a broad construction of § 201(c)(1)(A). The court
said that it was necessary to accomplish the statute's purpose of reaching "any situation in which the judgment of a
government agent might be clouded because of payments or gifts made to him by reason of his position 'otherwise than as
provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty."60 Evans was a complex case, which involved six defendants
and a sixteen-count indictment.*6 The indictment charged, among other things, that defendant Cecil Evans, a public
official at the Office of Education (United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare) accepted illegal gratuities
from the Collegiate Recovery and Credit Assistance Programs, ostensibly to ignore the company's misappropriation of
funds.62 Like many courts before them, the court held that there was no requirement of specific intent, that the prosecutor
must merely establish the "defendant accepted things of value knowingly and purposefully" and not by mistake63 The
court even held that a gratuity conviction could be upheld even if the official "actually lacks authority to perform an act to
benefit donor.'J
These cases offered a general prohibition against gift giving to public officials and established a bright-line rule
about the requisite elements of a gratuity offense. If a defendant gave a gift to a public official whom the defendant
thought was in a position to benefit him in that official capacity, he or she was guilty of the offense unless he or she could
prove they gave the gift out of social purpose or mistake. This broad interpretation served prosecutors well but later
courts have rejected it.
2. The Other End of the Spectrum: Reinterpreting the Official Act Requirement
The interpretation of the gratuity proscription as a status offense was rejected in a case markedly similar to Sun-
Diamond and presided over by the same court. In United States v. Espy' Secretary of Agriculture Espy was charged
with accepting illegal gratuities-this time, from Tyson Foods6 6 The Espy court held that "a gratuity motivated solely by
the official's position is not unlawful" and to find otherwise would read the "for or because of any official act" clause out
of the statute.6 1 While the court declined to hold that "concrete official acts must now be specified in the indictment" it
required a showing of "intent to reward an official for an act taken in the past or to be taken in the future.'68
The case was decided shortly after the court decided the appeal of Sun-Diamond and demonstrated that courts
have taken a marked turn in the way they read the statutory language "giving, offering or promising anything of value ...
for or because of any official act performed or to be performed .. ..'69 While the status offense approach virtually read the
"official act" clause out of the statute, the newest wave of cases have read the language to require a particular official act,
which should be named specifically in the indictment.
One such case is US. v Jennings,'0 where contractor Larry Jennings, Sr. was found guilty of providing illegal
gratuities to Charles Morris, an employee of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development who was
in charge of deciding what jobs were awarded to contractors.7 The Jennings court defined a gratuity as "a payment made
5 F. W. Standefer, 610 F.2d at 1078. Gratuities included five free golfing vacations for Mr. Niederberger and his family. Id.
ss Id. at 1080.
" 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978).
6 Evans, 572 F.2d at 480.
61 Id. at 461.
62 Id. at 462-63.
6 Id. at 480-81.
6 Id. at 481.
65 23 F. Supp.2d I (D.D.C. 1998).
6 Id. at 3.
67 Id. at 5.
68 Id.
69 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) (1994).
70 160 F.3d 1006 (4th Cir. 1998).
71 Jennings, 160 F.3d at 1010.
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to an official concerning a specific official act.',l2 Jennings was found guilty because the Government established a
specific official act Morris was to be rewarded for.73
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the Court first addressed the statutory scheme of 18 U.S.C. § 201, distinguishing between
the crimes of bribery and illegal gratuity.74 Holding that intent was the "distinguishing feature," the Court described
bribery as requiring a quid pro quo or specific intent to "corruptly" give or receive something of value "for or because of'
an official act.75 The Court held that a gratuity conviction, which imposed lesser punishment, required a lesser showing of
intent and no quid pro quo.x It held that a gratuity could simply be a reward for a public official's past or future act.7
The Court conducted extensive analysis to determine whether the gratuity statute required a connection between
the respondent's intent and a specific official act. 8 The Court rejected the earlier interpretation that giving a gratuity to a
public official merely because of their official position was a violation of the gratuity statute.9 It held that buying
generalized goodwill without the intent to influence a specific official act is not a violation of the gratuity statute and to
find otherwise would be counter to the language of the statutory text.80 The Court read the "for or because of any official
act performed or to be performed" clause as being "pregnant with the requirement that some particular official act be
identified and proved." 8' The Court found this was the most natural reading of the language and argued that if the
legislature had wanted a broad prohibition against gifts to officials it would have used more appropriate language82
The Court further contended that the trial court's interpretation of the gratuity provision would create the odd and
unanticipated result of criminalizing token gifts.83 If Joe Torre, manager of the World Series-winning Yankees, gave a
Yankees jersey to President Clinton, under the trial court's interpretation he would be in violation of the statute 4 By
accepting the gift, President Clinton would be guilty as well15 This absurd result is cured by the requirement that the gift
be tied to an official act as it is defined in the statute. 6
The Court disputed the government's argument that its interpretation was the only way to give effect to the
forward-looking prohibition on gratuities to people who have been selected for public office but have yet to assume their
responsibilities. 87 The Court was relatively unconcerned, arguing that this possibility was no more difficult to prosecute
then the prosecution of a public official with respect to some future official act 8
The Court next noted that if Congress wanted to adopt such a sweeping prohibition against gift giving to officials,
it would have "done so in a more precise and more administrable fashion.'"89 The Court supported this analysis by giving
examples of other laws that clearly prohibit giving gifts and receiving gifts. 90
The Court asserted that its interpretation, as opposed to the broad one adopted by the trial court, is more
compatible with the "intricate web of regulations .. . governing the acceptance of gifts and other self-enriching actions by
public officials."9' The decision then detailed numerous criminal and civil regulations relevant to public officials and the
72 Id. at 1013.
7 Id.
United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398. 403 (1999).
" Id. at 403-404.
76 Id. at 404.
n Id. at 405.
Id. at 406-08.
7 Id. at 406.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 408.
" Id. at 407-08.
84 Id. at 407.
8 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 408.
88 Id.
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giving of gratuities, noting their specifically targeted prohibitions.92 The Court concluded this argument by stating that "a
statute in this field that could linguistically be interpreted to be either a meat axe or a scalpel should reasonably be taken
to be the latter."93
The Court next addressed the related issue of whether jury instructions that indicated there was no need to prove a
link between the gift and the specific official act constituted harmless error?4 In reviewing the jury instructions, the Court
found them as flawed as the interpretation the trial court prosecution originally promulgated and held that they were not
harmless error.95
The Supreme Court, affirming the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, unanimously held that,
to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the Government "must prove a link between a thing of value
conferred upon a public official and a specific 'official act' for or because of which it was given.'96
V. COMMENT
In U.S. v. Sun-Diamond, the Supreme Court took an important step by affirming the "link requirement."
Unfortunately, it established the "link" as a requirement in all § 201(c)(1)(A) prosecutions without addressing what
quality and quantity of evidence is sufficient to prove a link. In his article, "The Federal Gratuity Statute: How Breaking
Bread Can Be Breaking the Law," Stanley Brand bemoaned the fact that the pre-Sun-Diamond interpretation of 1 8 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(1)(A) too broad of an overreaching prohibition on gifts.97 He wrote that a government employee who has simply
accepted a free lunch from a contractor could fall within its wide net, and, therefore, be subject to severe sanctions?8
However, in Sun-Diamond, the Supreme Court decisively affirmed the "link" requirement-that the gratuity proscription
was more then a mere status offense but required a link between the "official act" and the "thing of value.'99 While this
decision helped to clarify a murky area of the law and reassured federal employees they could eat their free lunches in
peace, the Court chose to limit its opinion to the narrow question of the link's requirement. It affirmed the necessity of
the link without defining what is sufficient evidence of a link. The courts clearly need more guidance.
The problems present in post-Sun-Diamond courts was demonstrated in United States v. Schaffer, a case decided
shortly after Sun-Diamond, and, incidentally, springing from the same independent counsel investigation that led to the
charges against Sun-Diamond. 00 On January 15, 1998, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted
Archibald Schaffer, III, on seven separate counts of a 15-count indictment, including two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(1)(A), the gratuity provision.o'0 The indictment alleged that Schaffer, working for Tyson Foods, provided
Secretary of Agriculture Espy with a variety of gifts during a time which USDA officials "were at various stages in the
process of developing and implementing initiatives that would seriously impact the business of Tyson Foods."'02 The
defendant was convicted by ajury of violating the gratuity statute, but the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal.10 3 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit upheld the acquittal as it related to the gratuity provision and found that "no rational trier of fact could
have concluded that Schaffer had acted with the requisite intent to influence . ... '"04 Citing Sun-Diamond, the court
upheld the link requirement and examined the nexus between the gifts given to Espy and the policies they may have been
92 Id. at 409-12.
" Id. at 412.
94Id.
9 Id. at 414.
9 Id.
9 Stanley Brand, The Federal Gratuity Statute: How Breaking Bread Can Be Breaking the Law, 42 FEDERAL LAWYER 17 (1995).
9 Id.
9 Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. at 414.
United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
101 Id. at 838.
102 Id. at 837. The gifts to Espy included four tickets to the inaugural dinner (at $1500 per person) and a $1.200 scholarship for his girlfriend.
Patricia Dempsey. Id. One of the initiatives at issue was the USDA's potential adoption of a "zero tolerance" pathogen control program for poultry.
Id.
103 Id. at 833.
104 Id. at 835-36.
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meant to influence.os Finding that there was no evidence that Schaffer "knew or anticipated anything about zero
tolerance" or any other decisions affecting Tyson within Espy's purview at the time of the gift giving, Schaffer was
acquitted of the gratuity charges.os
While the court based its decision on Sun-Diamond, it criticized the Supreme Court opinion for the "lack of
specific guidance ... on the amount and kind of evidence necessary to establish a nexus with an official act.'407 Sun-
Diamond closed the door on the status offense interpretation without clearly articulating the requirements of the newer
and more stringent standard. When the gratuity provision of 18 U.S.C. § 201 was interpreted as a status offense, as it was
in Standefer, the line between criminal offense and unethical-but legal-conduct was comparatively easy to draw 08 To
uphold a conviction under the gratuity provision no specific intent was required, the key determination was whether the
gift was given because of the official's position and not "solely for reasons for friendship or social purposes.'0 9 With the
new standard, it is more difficult to establish a violation. Attempting to determine what is necessary for the link, the
Schaffer opinion complained that:
Neither elementary linguistic analysis, the structure of the gratuity statute or its place within the larger
statutory and administrative fabric regulating gifts to officeholders, nor the desire to avoid trapping the
unwary point towards any specific interpretation of the degree of proof necessary to satisfy the Court's
'for or because of a particular official act' language.
With that dire pronouncement, how should future courts determine the sufficiency of the link? While Schaffer
complained about the lack of guidance, it failed to provide much instruction itself, other then to condone the use of
circumstantial evidence. 0
In the future, courts will be required to closely assess the intent of the defendant to determine whether there was a
link between the thing of value conferred and the official act. Unfortunately, as courts have complained in the past, "it is
no easy task to articulate the requisite intent necessary to constitute accepting or giving an illegal gratuity."'" While
bribery prosecutions have always required a showing of corrupt intent,"l2 the intent requirement for gratuity prosecutions
has changed over the years. In the past, courts have interpreted the gratuity offense as requiring no specific intent, merely
that a thing of value was knowingly given to an official (or knowingly accepted by an official) "otherwise than as
provided by the law." 113 Sun-Diamond moved the standard closer to the stringent requirements of the bribery statutes by
requiring prosecutors to prove that the thing of value was given "to reward past favorable acts or to make future ones
more likely.""14 This move has made it more challenging to clearly distinguish between the bribery and gratuity
provisions, a distinction that has already been hazy in previous application."'
While Sun-Diamond may have been correct to assert that an accurate reading of the text of 18 U.S.C. §
201(c)(1)(A) requires a link between the thing of value and a specific official act, if future courts require too rigorous a
showing of evidence to establish that link, they could risk establishing an impossible standard for future prosecutions. For
guidance, courts should look at what is deemed sufficient proof in bribery convictions (18 U.S.C. § 201(b)). As in bribery
prosecutions, prosecutions of the gratuity statute should rely heavily on circumstantial evidence to establish the requisite
intent necessitated by the link requirement." 6 Schaffer agreed and proclaimed that, "as with most cases in which the
defendant's state of mind is at issue, it may be near impossible to establish the requisite mens rea through direct
evidence."" 7 The court also said that "proof of an actor's subjective motivation will likely require recourse to
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116 Id.
"7 Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 843.
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circumstantial rather than direct evidence.'"18 Clearly, there will be many occasions where "the trier of fact can do no
more than ascribe an intent on the basis of the circumstances surrounding the defendant's actions.419
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case for a new trial on the
gratuity charges.' 20 How might the new court decide Sun-Diamond in light of the link requirement? The Schaffer
prosecution failed because prosecutors could not establish that the defendant knew about the policy decisions Espy was
considering which would have directly affected them.' 21 Thus, the "for or because of any official act" requirement-the
link between gift and the desired official act-was not met. While "any attempt to reduce the gratuity statute's nebulous
'for or because of' language into a more concrete formulation will necessarily be imperfect,'4 22 the facts in Sun-Diamond
seem to easily fit "for or because of . . an official act" language. Looking at the facts in Sun-Diamond, there were "two
matters in which respondent had an interest in favorable treatment from the Secretary at the time it bestowed the
gratuities," and evidence established that the company "sought the Department of Agriculture's assistance in persuading
EPA to abandon its proposed rule altogether, or at least to mitigate its impact."l23 Unlike Schaffer, there was a specific
official act the company was trying to initiate and evidence that places the gifts contemporaneous with the requests for the
specific official act. Should the court follow the lead of bribery convictions and allow itself to be guided by
circumstantial evidence it is highly possible that a conviction will result. And this time, the conviction may withstand the
Supreme Court's newer and more stringent requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
In his dissent in McNally v. United States, Justice Stevens noted the difficulty in defining "just when conduct
which is clearly unethical is also criminal."l 24 The required elements for a violation of the gratuity provision in 18 U.S.C.
201(c)(1)(A) have historically been tough to grasp. The gratuity statute is an important tool to combat political corruption
and the elements required for a conviction need to be clearly articulated.
Against a backdrop of inconsistent case law precedent, Sun-Diamond employed sound logic to clearly establish
that the government must prove a link between the unlawful gratuity and a specific official act. While Sun-Diamond took
a major step in interpreting the gratuity statute by establishing the link requirement, it chose not to address what quality
and quantity of evidence is sufficient to prove a link. This is regrettable because it leaves many unanswered questions for
future courts to address. While there is little case law to provide guidance, policy reasons suggest that future courts
shouldn't establish too rigorous a showing to intent, but-as in many bribery prosecutions-rely on circumstantial
evidence.
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